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Abstract: Nuclear plant operating experience and several studies show that the risk from shutdown 
operation during Modes 4, 5, and 6 at pressurized water reactors and Modes 4 and 5 at boiling water 
reactors can be significant. This paper describes using the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
full-power Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development of 
risk evaluation models for commercial nuclear power plants. The shutdown models are integrated 
with their respective internal event at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the 
modified system fault trees from the SPAR full-power model with shutdown event tree logic. 
Preliminary human reliability analysis results indicate that risk is dominated by the operator’s ability 
to correctly diagnose events and initiate systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is in the process of developing shutdown probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) models for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to estimate the risk 
from shutdown operations. The shutdown models are built in the existing U.S. NRC full-power 
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Level 1 model. References [1] and [2] provided the starting 
point for developing the event tree structure, plant operating state (POS) information, and other items 
specific to shutdown operations. Reference [1] delineates six technical specification operating modes 
for a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and breaks them down into 15 POSs. Reference [2], for a 
boiling water reactor (BWR) addresses the five technical specification operating modes with nine 
POSs. Modes 4, 5, and 6 for PWRs and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs primarily require the residual heat 
removal (RHR) system. Core damage frequency was analyzed for only the one POS that significantly 
dominated the risk for each plant type. In the case of PWRs, this is the mid-loop operating state 
(POS 5); for BWRs, it is reactor coolant system (RCS) level normal until the vessel head is off 
(POS 4) (References 1 and 2). 
In 2000, INL analysts developed an approach to estimate core damage frequency for shutdown 
operations. As stated in References [3] and [4], most of the risk from shutdown operations arises from 
Mode 4 (hot shutdown), Mode 5 (cold shutdown), and Mode 6 (refueling) for PWRs and Mode 4 
(cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (refueling) for BWRs. The three PWR modes are further delineated into 
a total of 12 POSs based on the status of the primary system. It is implicitly assumed here that when a 
PWR transitions from Mode 3 to Mode 4, heat removal from the primary system switches from the 
steam generators to the RHR system. The two BWR modes are further delineated into a total of seven 
POSs based on the status of the primary system. These POSs were mapped into four time windows to 
characterize the shutdown operations. The time windows define average decay heat generation rate. A 
specific POS can be split into more than one time window. Although much of the data from 
References [1] and [2] were used, they were reformatted to accommodate an analysis based on 
technical specification defined operating modes.  
In 2006, INL analysts further modified the analyses to integrate shutdown risk with internal and 
external events analyses. This changed the focus of the model from calculating only the overall risk 
integrated over a complete outage to a model that is also useful as an event or condition evaluation 
tool. Therefore, the emphasis on mapping of time window versus POS has been eliminated. In effect, 
the model now calculates risk for a single time window for a given POS. An analyst can adjust the 
model for situations in which an extended timeline can have a significant effect on the operator action 
and consequently the level of risk.  
Based on similar mitigating system applicability, the evolution of a plant outage has been delineated 
into nine POSs for PWRs and six POSs for BWRs. Only those plant configurations that rely primarily 
on the RHR system for removal of primary system decay and residual heat are included in this 
analysis. These mode-based plant operating states are described in the next section. This shutdown 
model is constructed using the system fault tree models, common cause failure modeling, and most of 
the basic event definition and quantification from the full-power SPAR model. 
2. SPAR MODELS AND THE SAPHIRE CODE 
PRA use has significantly increased in the NRC regulatory framework of the U. S. nuclear power 
industry. For this purpose, INL has developed a set of 75 plant-specific SPAR models to provide 
critical risk-based input to the regulatory process. The models use a linked fault tree construction 
methodology and results are calculated using the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated 
Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) quantification code. SAPHIRE is a powerful, personal computer 
software application for performing PRAs [5]. Using SAPHIRE, an analyst can perform a PRA for 
any complex system, facility, or process. For nuclear power plants, SAPHIRE can be used to model a 
plant’s response to initiating events, quantify associated core damage frequencies, or identify 
important contributors to core damage  The models are standardized in their quantification software, 
failure data used [6], human reliability methodology [7], modeling detail level, and naming rules. 
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR SHUTDOWN 
OPERATIONS 
The set of POSs selected for inclusion in the shutdown SPAR models were defined in an analysis of 
the transitions and configurations associated with plant shutdown, outage, and startup operations. 
Naming conventions similar to those used in References [3] and [4] have been followed, and can be 
used to associate event trees, fault trees, and basic events with a particular initiating event and plant 
state. The POS names are based on a six-character identifier that defines five POS characteristics: 
• Plant mode 
M4 Mode 4 
M5 Mode 5 
M6 Mode 6 
• Time frame (in relation to refueling mode) 
E Early (before refueling) 
L Late (after refueling) 
X Not applicable (refueling mode) 
• Pressure (not applicable to PWR) 
L Low or atmospheric 
H Hydro test 
• RCS inventory status 
PWR: BWR: 
R Reduced RCS inventory  N Normal RCS inventory  
F Full RCS inventory S Steam-line RCS inventory 
C Cavity flooded U Cavity flooded 
• RCS pressure boundary status (not applicable to BWR) 
V Vent open in the RCS pressure boundary 
I Intact RCS pressure boundary 
• RCS loop status (not applicable to BWR) 
B Blocked RCS loops (i.e., all steam generators are isolated from the rest of the RCS) 
O Open RCS loops (i.e., RCS flow through the steam generators is possible). 
The fraction of time spent in any POS (and whether it is entered at all) is related to the type of outage 
being undertaken. Table 1 lists the 15 overall POSs for PWRs with the corresponding identifiers used 
in the SPAR models. Table 2 lists the POSs and SPAR identifiers for BWRs. 
4. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
The current low power and shutdown SPAR model focuses on plant operating Modes 4, 5, and 6 for 
PWRs and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs. The initiating events included in the model are the loss of RHR 
(failures and isolations of RHR are considered separately), loss of inventory (from the creation of 
openings or flow diversions in the RCS), loss of level control while at reduced inventory conditions, 
over-draining events, and both partial and full losses of offsite power. The SPAR model does not 
include reactivity control issues, cold over-pressurization issues, spent fuel pool events, or fuel-
handling accidents. 
There are five important areas where analysts should be aware of modeling assumptions made in 
development of the SPAR model for shutdown evaluations: 
• Model success criteria 
• “Weighted-average” fractions for time spent in various POSs 
• Test and maintenance baseline assumptions 
• Human error probabilities 
• Definition of core damage. 
There can be a lack of consensus on the success criteria for providing adequate heat removal during 
shutdown. This problem makes it difficult to unambiguously model shutdown configurations. Some 
of the methods for providing decay heat removal (such as reflux cooling and gravity feed) are rarely, 
if ever, tested or used and there is little known about the plant operators’ understanding and training 
concerning the actual implementation of these methods of RCS heat removal. 
The configurations that are allowable during shutdown operation and the amount of time spent in each 
vary significantly between plants and even between outages at any given plant. Data are lacking for 
important factors that affect shutdown core damage frequency such as the fraction of time spent in a 
mid-loop configuration. Another question without a clear answer is the fraction of time that secondary 
cooling is viable because of constraints such as the existence of an opening in the RCS pressure 
boundary that cannot be readily closed in response to an emergency. Test and maintenance 
unavailability are also important in calculating core damage frequency but sufficient data to 
characterize them accurately are currently not available. Identifying equipment that is out-of-service 
but can be rapidly put into service also appears to be a significant issue that is not explicitly addressed 
in the model. These issues are critical when calculating an average outage risk. When calculating risk 
from a specific outage or from an actual event occurring in a specific outage, these issues are resolved 
by using outage specific data. 
Human error is another important consideration. Evaluation of the factors that may increase the 
likelihood of operator error during a particular condition is hampered by the limited information and 
analyses performed to date. The SPAR shutdown-related human error probabilities in the model were 
generated through SAPHIRE’s built-in human reliability analysis (HRA) code [5]. 
Recovery of failed equipment also is not universally included in the model. Some system fault trees 
(which for the most part are taken directly from the corresponding full-power SPAR model) include a 
generalized recovery event obtained from actual operating experience data for full-power operations. 
Another important aspect in characterizing shutdown risk is the decay heat level. To account for the 
various levels of decay heat, the SPAR shutdown models define four time windows in terms of time 
after reactor shutdown (see Table 3). 
Table 1: PWR Operating States and Corresponding Modes and SPAR Descriptions [1] 
Plant 
Operating 
State POS Description 
Technical 
Specification 
Mode 
SPAR
Descriptiona
POS 1 Low power and reactor shutdown Power Operation NA 
POS 2 Cooldown with steam generators from operating temperature to 
345°F Hot Standby NA 
POS 3 Cooldown with RHR from 345 to 200°F Hot Shutdown M4EFIO 
POS 4 Cooldown with RHR (below ?200°F) Cold Shutdown M5EFIO 
POS 5 Draining RCS to mid-loop Cold Shutdown 
POS 6 Mid-loop operation Cold Shutdown 
POS 7 Fill for refuelling Cold Shutdown 
M5ERIO 
MERVB 
POS 8 Refueling Refueling M6XCVB 
POS 9 Draining RCS to mid-loop after refueling Cold Shutdown 
POS 10 Mid-loop operations after refueling Cold Shutdown 
POS 11 Refilling RCS Cold Shutdown 
M5LRIO 
MLRVB 
POS 12 RCS heatup solid and draw bubble Cold Shutdown M5LFIO 
POS 13 RCS heatup to 350°F Hot Shutdown M4LFIO 
POS 14 RCS heatup with steam generators available (above 350°F) Startup NA 
POS 15 Startup and low power operations Power Operation NA 
a. NA is not applicable. 
Table 2: BWR Operating States and Corresponding Modes and SPAR Descriptions [2] 
Plant 
Operating 
State POS Description 
Technical 
Specification 
Mode 
SPAR
Descriptiona
POS 1 Power operation Power Operation NA
POS 2 Startup; mode switch in startup/hot standby Hot Standby NA 
POS 3 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature greater than 200°F Hot Shutdown NA
POS 4 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
low pressure, normal water level 
Cold Shutdown M4ELNb
POS 5 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
head off, low pressure, water level at the main steam lines 
Cold Shutdown M5ELS
POS 6 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
low pressure, cavity flooded 
Cold Shutdown M5XLU 
POS 7 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
low pressure, water level at the main steam lines 
Cold Shutdown M5LLS
POS 8 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
low pressure, normal water level 
Cold Shutdown M4LLN
POS 9 Mode switch in shutdown, plant temperature ?200°F or lower, 
high pressure, normal water level 
Cold Shutdown M4LHN
a. NA is not applicable. 
Table 3: Time Window Definitions for PWRs 
Condition 
Time 
Window 1 
Time 
Window 2 
Time 
Window 3 
Time 
Window 4 
Plant Operating States 
PWR 
M5ERIO 
M5ERVB 
M4EFIO 
M5EFIO  
M5LRIO 
M5LRVB  
M4LFIO  
M5LFIO 
 M6XCVB 
Average Time to Boil Off 
(before RHR is tripped or isolated) 
15 min 30 min 90 min >3 hr 
5. EVENT TREE MODELS 
The event trees are organized in a hierarchal fashion, with the single initial event tree determining the 
specific POS. Figures 1 through 6 show example event trees for a PWR. Figure 1 begins with the 
assumption that the plant is shut down (i.e., Mode 4 [hot shutdown], 5 [cold shutdown], or 6 
[refueling]). The end states of the shutdown event tree delineate the nine POSs that result from the 
analysis. Figure 2 is similar but shows a BWR beginning with the assumption that the plant is in 
Mode 4 (hot shutdown) or Mode 5 (cold shutdown and refueling). Each POS then transfers to a 
second-level event tree (Figure 3) that accounts for the likelihood of each of the seven initiating 
events occurring, given a particular POS. Each of these second-level event tree end states then 
transfers to a third-level event tree (Figure 4) specifically tailored to the initiating event and includes 
initiating event-specific diagnosis and recovery functions. The initiating event- and POS-specific 
details are captured in the event tree logic rules (e.g., steam generators are not available for cooling). 
Finally, each initiating event tree transfers to two plant response trees that model the responses of the 
RHR and emergency core cooling systems (Figures 5 and 6). 
Note that the shutdown event tree is not linked logically with the rest of the event trees. It is linked 
only by the conditional probabilities that it generates for its various end states. In other words, the 
shutdown tree can be quantified to generate conditional probabilities for being in the nine POS end 
states. Those conditional probabilities can then be used as event probabilities when quantifying any or 
all of the nine POS-specific event trees. 
6. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Because of the very limited number of automatic equipment actions that are typically functional 
during shutdown, operator actions are more dominant during shutdown than during at-power 
conditions. The shutdown SPAR models use the SPAR-H methodology [7]. The SPAR-H method is 
straight forward, easy to apply, and is based on a human information processing model and results 
from human performance studies available in the behavioral science literature.  
As with any simplified method, SPAR-H has modeling and analysis limitations. SPAR-H identifies 
eight performance shaping factors (PSFs) capable of influencing human performance: available time, 
stress and stressors, experience and training, complexity, ergonomics, procedures, fitness for duty, 
and work process. Traditionally, accounting for the influence of multiple shaping factors with 
multiple levels of influence without imposing a high degree of expert consensus judgment on the 
HRA process has proven difficult. Ultimately, the analyst’s expertise and judgment comes into play in 
assigning the correct level of PSF, particularly in the scenarios where there is no significant time 
available to diagnose the failures and recover from it.  
In addition, because of the large numbers of sequences that contain multiple human error 
probabilities, HRA dependency analysis is critical to realistic shutdown analysis. Finally, many of the 
sequences take many hours to lead to core damage leaving significant time for operators to perform 
required tasks. SPAR-H, as with all HRA methods, does not supply good guidance on dealing with 
these issues. The project continues to refine this area of analysis. 
7. TYPICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 lists the preliminary conditional core damage probabilities of an initiating event occurring 
while the plant is in a particular POS. As expected, a majority of the risk is during reduced inventory 
operations. However, this risk is dominated by the operator actions, such as failure to diagnose or 
initiate the systems in time.  
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Figure 1: A First-Level PWR Shutdown Event Tree 
Figure 2: A First-Level BWR Shutdown Event Tree 
Figure 3: A Second-Level PWR Event Tree (M4EFIO) 
Figure 4: A Third-Level PWR Event Tree (Loss of Inventory) 
Figure 5: A PWR Restoration of RHR Cooling Event Tree
Figure 6: A PWR ECCS Inventory Control Event Tree 
Table 4: Conditional Core Damage Probability for PWR Shutdown Operations 
  Probability per Hour per Initiating Event 
POS POS Description ISOL1 LOAC2 LOI3 LOLC4 LOOP5 LORHR6 OD7
M4EFIO Mode 4 Early 
RCS Full & Intact, Loops Open 7.3E-09 3.9E-08 1.4E-10 0.0E+00 1.3E-09 6.4E-09 NA 
M4LFIO Mode 4 Late 
RCS Full & Intact, Loops Open 7.3E-09 3.9E-08 1.4E-10 0.0E+00 1.3E-09 6.4E-09 NA 
M5EFIO Mode 5 Early 
RCS Full & Intact, Loops Open  7.3E-09 3.9E-08 1.4E-10 0.0E+00 1.3E-09 6.4E-09 NA 
M5ERIO Mode Early 
RCS Reduced & Intact, Loops 
Open 
6.1E-05 3.0E-05 1.0E-05 9.7E-08 5.0E-06 5.3E-05 5.4E-06
M5ERVB Mode Early 
RCS Reduced & Vented, Loops 
Blocked 
5.1E-05 4.1E-05 8.3E-05 8.1E-08 4.7E-06 4.5E-05 4.5E-06
M5LFIO Mode 5 Late 
RCS Full & Intact, Loops Open 7.3E-09 3.9E-08 1.4E-10 0.0E+00 1.3E-09 6.4E-09 NA 
M5LRIO Mode 5 Late 
RCS Reduced & Intact, Loops 
Open 
7.3E-09 3.9E-08 4.4E-08 2.1E-10 1.3E-09 6.4E-09 1.1E-08
M5LRVB Mode 5 Late 
RCS Reduced & Vented, Loops 
Blocked 
3.2E-06 2.3E-05 4.4E-05 8.1E-08 7.9E-07 2.8E-06 4.5E-06
M6XCVB Mode 6 
RCS Full & Vented, Loops 
Blocked 
1.5E-08 6.1E-07 1.6E-09 0.0E+00 1.4E-08 1.4E-08 NA 
Notes:  
1. Isolation of the primary means of shutdown cooling, typically RHR, from closure of a hotleg isolation valve. 
2. Loss of alternating current power only to the running RHR train. 
3. Loss of RCS inventory typically due to valve misalignment.  
4. Loss of level control during reduced inventory (this is a short-term level decrease necessitating a shutdown of 
RHR without a loss of inventory). 
5. Loss of offsite power. 
6. Loss of the running RHR loop—not covered by the other initiators. 
7. Overdrain—failure to terminate the drain down to mid-loop when desired level is reached (this is the only per 
demand initiator). 
8. SHORTCOMINGS IN SHUTDOWN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
The initiating events used in the shutdown models are derived from those provided in References [3] 
and [4]. An initiating event in the context of this report is an event that results in a loss of the 
operation shutdown cooling loop such that there is either a 15°F temperature rise or a mode change 
(i.e., temperature rises above 200°F). Events that satisfy this criterion were extracted from NRC 
licensee event reports and entered into a stand-alone database for use in estimating initiating event 
frequencies for shutdown. The criterion of 15°F temperature rise is rather arbitrary. There were 
significant numbers of events that resulted in loss of RHR but recovered in a very short time. No 
specific data are available on other initiating events during shutdown. Additional research is currently 
underway to expand these data to include all losses of RHR without a temperature increase restriction. 
During full-power operation, many safety systems are tested regularly. However, during shutdown, 
scheduled testing of a component or system depends on the POS and plant procedures. For example, a 
non-operating RHR train and its support systems cannot be taken down for scheduled test and 
maintenance while operating in reduced inventory POS. However, there is a very high likelihood that 
one RHR train will not be available when a cavity is flooded because it is out for test and 
maintenance. Because of these considerations, the normal test and maintenance terms in the at-power 
models are not used in the shutdown models. Instead, the analyst is required to include actual 
equipment unavailability during event analysis. Also, the time available for operator actions for 
recovery depends on the POS of the plant. There are no data on mean time to repair or recover from 
scheduled or forced maintenance during shutdown operations. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Because of the very limited number of automatic equipment actions that are typically functional 
during shutdown, operator actions are more dominant during shutdown than during at-power 
conditions. The risk is dominated by the operator’s understanding of the event and the ability to 
respond appropriately. In the example PWR, more than 98% of the core damage frequency was 
dominated by operator actions. Several core damage cutsets include three or more operator actions. 
Therefore, understanding and modeling dependency of operator actions is a very important aspect of 
the total risk. Based on this analysis of PWRs, the risk to fuel damage (per hour) during shutdown 
operations is comparable to at-power operations. 
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